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Abstract
This article explains why R2P failed to motivate action to protect vulnerable Syrians in 
the first two years of the crisis. We focus on the United States and argue that official 
discourse ‘localised’ the meaning R2P by grafting it on to preconceived ideas of Amer-
ica’s role in supporting democratic revolutions, which is how the situation was under-
stood. American ‘exemplarism’ demanded the US support democracy by calling on 
Assad to go while not corrupting the ‘homegrown’ revolution through foreign interven-
tion. The call for political and criminal accountability aligned exemplarist democracy 
promotion to R2P, but it did nothing to protect vulnerable populations from the con-
flict that ensued. This refraction of the norm complicated the United Nations spon-
sored peace process, which provided an alternative means of protecting the Syrian 
population. We address a gap in the literature by examining Western localisation and 
draw policy lessons, namely the importance of examining national predispositions 
when implementing R2P.
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Syria remains one of the most challenging of humanitarian crises and has been 
at the top of the international agenda for almost a decade. Various senior dip-
lomats have spoken not just of the scale of suffering but of international soci-
ety’s responsibility to protect the Syrian population from atrocities. This was 
apparent very early in the crisis. The Office of the United Nations Special Ad-
viser for the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to Protect (R2P), for 
instance, issued eight statements regarding Syria between 2011 and 2013,1 and 
the Obama administration wrestled publicly with its sense that something 
must be done, accepting that ‘the moral thing to do is not to stand by and do 
nothing’.2 But while US foreign policymakers referenced a responsibility to 
protect Syrian populations, occasionally referring directly to the UN’s ‘R2P’ 
doctrine, it was by no means certain what those references meant for practice. 
This uncertainty is indicative of the indeterminate character of norms; their 
meaning is constructed through discursive practice and is thus contingent on 
how agents interpret a particular situation, which can lead to contestation.3 In 
the case of Syria, ‘applying’ generic meanings of R2P, such as those articulated 
in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (iciss) or in the 2005 UN World Summit outcome document, told 
us that something had to be done to protect Syrian populations. It did not offer 
uncontested prescriptions for practice. This is all the truer in this case as R2P 
was not the only norm or principle guiding the US response to Syria.4
1 Out of a total of 22 statements issued overall during 2011–2013 inclusive. UN Office on Geno-
cide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Public Statements’, https://www.un.org/
en/genocideprevention/public-statements.shtml, accessed 7 February 2020.
2 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Reinfeldt of Sweden in 
Joint Press Conference’, 4 September 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press 
-office/2013/09/04/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-reinfeldt-sweden-joint 
-press-, accessed 7 May 2019.
3 Antje Wiener, ‘Contested Meanings of Norms: A Research Framework’, Comparative Europe-
an Politics, 5/1: 1–17 (2007); Antje Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on 
Norms and International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 35/1: 175–193 (2009); 
Mona L. Krook and Jacqui True, ‘Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The Unit-
ed Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 18/1: 103–127 (2010).
4 Other considerations came into play, including other norms and more prudential consider-
ations. See, for instance, the interview of Barack Obama by Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama 
Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/
the-obama-doctrine/471525/, accessed 7 February 2020. As such, we do not argue that R2P 
was the main influencing factor, nor that it played a direct causal role in the US response to 
the Syrian crisis. Rather, we want to explore how R2P helped to enable US policies that ulti-
mately failed to protect the Syrian population.
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It is in this discursive space that agents often graft on to a norm’s meaning 
their particular predispositions. Building on the idea of ‘norm localisation’5 as 
a practice by which local actors actively build congruence between global 
norms and local beliefs, identities, traditions, practices, cognitive priors or nor-
mative context, we explore how R2P was localised so as to become congruent 
with the broader pre-existing American normative political context which 
supported non-intervention. We demonstrate how the US understanding of its 
responsibility to protect Syrian populations was influenced by beliefs, identi-
ties, traditions, and practices of American exceptionalism, and argue that this 
local American cognitive prior or normative context influenced America’s 
framing of the Syrian situation primarily as a struggle for democracy.6 Support-
ing that struggle helped reconstitute America’s image as a state that was ‘on the 
right side of history’. At the same time, however, the Obama administration 
adopted an ‘exemplarist’ rather than a ‘vindicationist’ form of exceptionalism.7 
As such, the US would be the ‘well-wisher’ of the Syrian people as they resisted 
Assad, but it would not intervene.
In exploring this case, this article makes three interlinked contributions. 
First, and at the empirical level, we provide an in-depth example of R2P norm 
localisation, showing how American policymakers, through discourse, fram-
ing, and grafting, brought R2P into congruence with local beliefs and practices 
of American exceptionalism, specifically exemplarism. Secondly, we have 
identified and helped to address a gap in the R2P norm localisation literature. 
Although Amitav Acharya theorised localisation was open to any actors, irre-
spective of their size or international prominence,8 the existing R2P localisa-
tion literature focuses almost exclusively on cases where the non-Western 
world is the localising actor.9 By showing how a leading Western actor localised 
5 Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institu-
tional Change in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization, 58/2: 239–275 (2004); Ami-
tav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009); David Capie, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia: 
Framing, Resistance and the Localization Myth’, The Pacific Review, 25/1: 75–93 (2012); Kai 
Michael Kenkel and Felippe De Rosa, ‘Localization and Subsidiarity in Brazil’s Engagement 
with the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 7/3–4: 325–349 (2015).
6 As such, our focus is primarily on the United States itself, and we only make references to the 
‘local’ Syrian views as and when they enter the US debate.
7 H. W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
8 Amitav Acharya, ‘Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and 
Rule-Making in the Third World’, International Studies Quarterly, 55/1: 95–123 (2011), p. 98.
9 For exceptions see Jocelyn Vaughan and Tim Dunne, ‘Leading from the Front: America, Libya 
and the Localisation of R2P, Cooperation and Conflict 50/1: 29–49 (2015); Eglantine Staunton 
and Jason Ralph, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Norm Cluster and the Challenge of Atrocity 
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2021 12:14:02PM
via free access
 249R2P and the Arab Spring
global responsibility to protect 12 (2020) 246-270
the R2P norm, we complement the existing literature, thus helping avoid any 
misconception that R2P localisation is purely a non-Western phenomenon or 
that the West alone is associated with the ‘global’ R2P. Finally, we explain how 
norm localisation can have a significant impact on the practical decisions tak-
en by states. US discourse indeed infused R2P with its own meanings which 
affected the way it (and a number of other actors) responded to the Syrian 
crisis. In particular, the localisation we explore made two decisions particu-
larly unlikely: a direct intervention and a negotiated solution with the Syrian 
regime. With this localisation of R2P, the United States thus restricted its own 
policy choices (and that of other international actors) while prolonging the 
Syrian conflict.
This article is organised into three sections. First, we analyse how the R2P 
literature has used the notion of ‘norm localisation’ to study local variants of 
the global R2P norm. We demonstrate that the focus of these analyses has 
almost exclusively been on the ways non-Western actors have localised R2P, 
which, given the specific claim by Acharya that localisation applies to all ac-
tors, means there is a gap in the literature. We reflect on the implications of 
this gap, and therefore the need to complement existing work by examining 
how a Western actor such as the United States localised R2P. In the second 
section, we explain how US officials referred to the norm of R2P and local-
ised it by insisting on regime change in Syria. We make these claims through 
an analysis of both executive and legislative American discourses. Our data-
set is composed of 658 texts comprising declarations and interviews by the 
President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, White House officials, as well as 
Congressional and Senate hearings that mention or are connected to Syria. 
We analysed these texts for discursive patterns or ‘linguistic regularities’ that 
‘create a relative predictability in meaning production’.10 The data covers the 
period of March 2011 to December 2013, from the beginning of the crisis to the 
aftermath of the August 2013 Ghouta chemical weapons attacks. This period 
is crucial as it represents the moment in which the US formed its position on 
the Syrian crisis. Far from being an obvious or necessary choice, linking R2P to 
regime change appealed to American domestic values and to the broader per-
ception of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a progressive evolution of history. As we explain 
in the third section, however, this invocation of R2P and exceptionalism was 
highly influenced by the ‘exemplarist’ strand of thought. As a consequence, the 
 commitment to protect the Syrian population from atrocity crimes – which is 
 Prevention: An Analysis of the European Union’s Strategy in Myanmar’, European Journal 
of International Relations, online, 1 November 2019. See also footnote 15.
10 Jason Ralph, Jack Holland and Kalina Zhekova, ‘Before the Vote: UK Foreign Policy Dis-
course on Syria 2011–13’, Review of International Studies, 43/5: 875–897 (2017), p. 879.
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the essence of R2P – was dwarfed by a need to respect the Syrian democratic 
uprising as a local and indigenous movement for which the US could only pro-
vide an example.
1 Norm Localisation, R2P and the West
Localisation has become a key framework for scholars interested in norm dif-
fusion at the international level. It has been applied to a variety of topics,11 
among them R2P. Yet the R2P norm localisation literature, with the exception 
by Vaughan and Dunne, and more recently, Staunton and Ralph,12 focuses on 
11 A 20 September 2019 Web of Science topic search for ‘norm localization’ and ‘norm locali-
sation’ between 2004 and 2019 generated 25 politics and international relations results, 
including: David Capie, ‘Localization as Resistance: The Contested Diffusion of Small 
Arms Norms in Southeast Asia’, Security Dialogue, 39/6: 637–658 (2008); Allan Collins, 
‘Norm Diffusion and asean’s Adoption and Adaption of Global hiv/aids Norms’, Inter-
national Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13/3: 369–397 (2013); Sarai B. Aharoni, ‘Internal 
 Variation in Norm Localization: Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325 in Israel’, 
Social Politics, 21/1: 1–25 (2014); Oliver Hesengert, ‘Global Norms in Domestic Politics: En-
vironmental Norm Contestation in Cambodia’s Hydropower Sector’, The Pacific Review, 
28/4: 505–528 (2015); Lisbeth Zimmerman, Global Norms with a Local Face. Rule of Law 
Promotion and Norm Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Lisbeth 
Zimmerman, ‘Same Same or Different? Norm Diffusion Between Resistance, Compliance, 
and Localization in Post-Conflict States’, International Studies Perspectives, 17/1: 98–115 
(2016); Lisbeth Zimmerman, Nicole Deitelhoff and Max Lesch, ‘Unlocking the Agency of 
the Governed: Contestation and Norm Dynamics’, Third World Thematics: A twq Journal, 
2/5: 691–708 (2017); Elias Steinhilper, ‘From “the Rest” to “the West”? Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and the Western Bias in Norm Diffusion Research’, International Studies Review, 
17/4: 536–555 (2015).
12 Vaughan and Dunne, ‘Leading from the Front’; Staunton and Ralph, ‘The Responsibil-
ity to Protect Norm Cluster’. Matthias Dembinski and Berenike Schott, ‘Regional Se-
curity Arrangements as a Filter for Norm Diffusion: The African Union, the European 
Union and the Responsibility to Protect’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
27/2: 362–380 (2014) is another rare exception albeit with a dual focus. Likewise Carla 
Barqueiro, Kate Seaman and Katherine T. Towey, ‘Regional Organizations and Respon-
sibility to Protect: Normative Reframing or Normative Change?’, Politics and Gover-
nance, 4/3: 37–49 (2016) explore regional divergences on R2P implementation between 
the European Union (EU), but also League of Arab States (las), and the African Union 
(AU) on Libya and Syria.  Eglantine Staunton, ‘France and the Responsibility to Protect: 
A Tale of Two Norms’, International Relations, 32/3: 366–387 (2018) applies localisa-
tion as one part of a four-part theoretical framework, whereas we choose to focus on it 
exclusively.
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how the non-Western world (for instance, Africa;13 Brazil;14 China and Japan;15 
and Southeast Asia)16 localises R2P. In this section, we review this literature to 
define the concept, to establish the gap regarding its application to the West, 
and to assess the implications. We then examine in more detail the Vaughan 
and Dunne article as the only work to apply norm localisation to the US rela-
tionship with R2P.17
Acharya outlined two perspectives on norm diffusion: one spoke to a ‘moral 
cosmopolitanism’, and another stressed ‘the role of domestic, political, or-
ganizational, and cultural variables’, albeit in an ‘unduly static’ manner that 
 described them as barriers to diffusion.18 The main features of the first per-
spective were that the norms researched were ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘universal’. The 
key actors involved were transnational agents and the focus was on the ‘con-
version’ of local agents, whose ‘resistance’ to cosmopolitan norms was seen as 
‘illegitimate or immoral’ rather than ‘contestation’. Unfortunate consequences 
of this approach followed. These included a focus on the international level, 
therefore ‘downplaying the agency of local actors’; a view of norm diffusion 
that implied ‘teaching by transnational agents’; and a portrayal of ‘internation-
al prescriptions’ as one part of ‘an implicit dichotomy between good global or 
universal norms and bad regional or local norms’.19
13 Paul D. Williams, ‘From Non-intervention to Non-indifference: The Origins and Develop-
ment of the African Union’s Security Culture’, African Affairs, 106/423: 253–279 (2007); 
Paul D. Williams, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Protect’, Norm Localisation, and African Interna-
tional Society’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 1/3: 392–416 (2009).
14 Kenkel and De Rosa, ‘Localization and Subsidiarity in Brazil’s Engagement with the Re-
sponsibility to Protect’; Cristina G. Stefan, ‘On Non-Western Norm Shapers: Brazil and the 
Responsibility while Protecting’, European Journal of International Security, 2/1: 88–110 
(2017).
15 Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, ‘Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and 
Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect’, International Relations, 25/2: 204–223 
(June 2011).
16 Alex J. Bellamy and Mark Beeson, ‘The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Can 
asean Reconcile Humanitarianism and Sovereignty?’, Asian Security, 6/3: 262–279 (2010); 
Alex J. Bellamy and Sarah E. Davies, ‘The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific Re-
gion’, Security Dialogue, 40/6: 547–574 (2011); Alex J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, 
‘The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-interference and Sover-
eignty as Responsibility’, The Pacific Review, 24/2: 179–200 (2011); Capie, ‘The Responsibil-
ity to Protect Norm’; Herman Kraft, ‘RtoP by Increments: The aichr and Localizing the 
Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia’, The Pacific Review, 25/1 Special Issue: 27–49 
(2012).
17 Vaughan and Dunne, ‘Leading from the Front’.
18 Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread’, pp. 242–243.
19 ibid., p. 242.
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It was on the basis of this critique that Acharya proposed the concept of 
norm localisation or constitutive localisation,20 which, according to Capie, 
‘represents a significant break with orthodox explanations of norm dynamics’ 
whose cosmopolitan advocates tended to be typically Western states and non-
governmental organisations (ngos) in the global north.21 Acharya defined lo-
calisation as ‘the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and 
cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former 
developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’.22 Rather 
than facing a dichotomy of either accepting or rejecting foreign norms, localisa-
tion conceptualises how local actors can incorporate the foreign into the local 
even when it did not initially appear to cohere.
Although developed by Acharya in reference to Southeast Asia,23 and with a 
view to addressing the ‘general neglect of the normative behavior of Third 
World countries and their regional institutions in the growing literature on 
norm dynamics’, norm localisation is ‘generic to all actors, big or small, power-
ful or weak’.24 The broader literature on norm localisation includes some work 
exploring how Western countries themselves adapt global norms.25 Yet the 
R2P norm localisation literature has thus far tended to focus on cases in which 
non-Western actors are engaged in localisation such as: Africa, Brazil, China 
and Japan, and Southeast Asia.26 This is not a criticism of this body of work. 
Indeed, the choice of non-Western actors makes sense given each author’s rel-
evant regional expertise and deliberate focus.
We are not suggesting that this literature assumes R2P localisation to be an 
exclusively non-Western phenomenon. To repeat Acharya, norm localisation is 
‘generic to all actors’.27 But the relative lack of studies examining R2P localisa-
tion by Western actors does risk this association. Conscious of how scholarship 
20 He subsequently proposed ‘norm subsidiarity’ which he classified as: outward looking; 
based on a rejection of the external norm which is regarded as a threat to local norms; and 
an activity which is the preserve of small or peripheral international actors. Acharya, 
‘Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders’, p. 97. Given our exclusive focus on how the US – 
a powerful actor – made R2P fit within its own normative context, with attention only to 
domestic political constituencies, our research falls under the framework of localisation 
rather than subsidiarity.
21 Capie, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Norm’, p. 79.
22 Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread’, pp. 245.
23 Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread’; Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter.
24 Acharya, ‘Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders’, pp. 95, 98.
25 For example, in Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, ‘Vernacularization on the Ground: Local 
Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru, India, China, and the US’, Global Networks, 9/4: 
441–461 (2009). See also footnote 14.
26 See footnotes 16–19.
27 Acharya, ‘Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders’, pp. 95, 98.
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constructs background knowledge, we consider it important for normative 
reasons to address this imbalance in R2P studies. This is because an associa-
tion of ‘the local’ with non-Western states may imply that ‘the global’ interpre-
tation of a norm is taken from Western meanings. Western states could then in 
turn claim unwarranted authority as spokespersons for what they claim to be 
the ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ expression of R2P on the grounds that since non-Western 
states localise it, Western states adopt it as is. We note here for instance that 20 
of the 37 states which Negrón-Gonzales and Contarino identified in 2014 as 
having ‘embraced’ R2P were Western/European28 while those then rejecting or 
adapting the norm were all non-Western.29
To argue that Western states have, and therefore can, determine the mean-
ing of R2P is not only normatively problematic, it is empirically incorrect. 
No single state nor regional grouping of states speaks for the global R2P. For 
instance, there is a broad recognition of Africa’s significant role in the emer-
gence and formation of R2P to the extent that ‘the deepening of international 
society originated to a great extent from the periphery rather than the core’,30 
via the efforts of Francis Deng,31 Kofi Annan, and Article 4(h) of the Constitu-
tive Act of the African Union.32 The International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty specifically included a genuinely cosmopolitan 
membership.33 The globally inclusive UN has also been important in defining 
28 Our definition of Western countries is based on those who are member of the UN regional 
group, Western European and Others Group (weog). This has 28 member states, plus one 
member state (the United States) as an observer state. United Nations Department for 
General Assembly and Conference Management, ‘UN Regional Groups of Member States’, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml, accessed 7 February 2020.
29 Melinda Negrón-Gonzales and Michael Contarino, ‘Local Norms Matter: Understanding 
National Responses to the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Governance: A Review of Mul-
tilateralism and International Organizations, 20/2: 255–276 (2014), p. 262.
30 Prantl and Nakano, ‘Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia’, p. 207. See also Oliver Stuenkel, 
‘Who Will Write about R2P’s African Origins?’, 9 December 2012, https://www.postwest 
ernworld.com/2012/12/09/who-will-write-about-r2ps-african-origins/, accessed 25 April 
2019.
31 Working alongside Roberta Cohen.
32 Article 4(h) established as a guiding principle ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. The Act is regarded as the 
first international treaty to explicitly make such a principled commitment. Organization 
of African Unity (oau), Constitutive Act of the African Union, p. 7, https://au.int/sites/de 
fault/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf, accessed 13 November 2019.
33 The twelve commissioners being drawn from Australia, Algeria, Canada, the United 
States, Russia, Germany, South Africa, the Philippines, Switzerland, Guatemala, and India. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (iciss), The Responsi-
bility to Protect (Ottawa: idrc, 2001), pp. 77–79.
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the norm’s framework through the 2005 World Summit Outcomes Document, 
and regular General Assembly informal debates from 2009, Security Council 
resolutions and reports instigated by the then Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon 
of South Korea. Finally, Western advocacy efforts by the likes of Canada34  
and Australia35 have been accompanied by those of Brazil,36 Guatemala,37 and 
Rwanda,38 among many others.39
Yet it remains the case that the majority of R2P scholarship using the con-
cept of norm localisation has been focused on non-Western cases, often but 
not always juxtaposing their non-Western ‘local’ with an unspecified or under-
theorised ‘global’.40 To be clear, these authors are likely reflecting contempo-
rary perspectives of R2P in the non-Western world rather than consciously 
constructing a Western-global / non-Western-local dichotomy; and there is of 
course a large literature on how Western states relate to R2P.41 Yet this latter 
34 Prantl and Nakano, ‘Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia’, p. 208.
35 Capie, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Norm’, pp. 86–87.
36 See the speech given by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff before the 66th UN General 
Assembly, 21 September 2011 (see A/66/PV.11) and the follow up ‘Responsibility while Pro-
tecting’ concept note submitted for discussion by the UN Security Council at the Protec-
tion of Civilians in Armed Conflicts meeting, S/PV.6650, 11 November 2011, UN Doc. 
A/66/551–S/2011/701, 11 November 2011.
37 Guatemala led the drafting on behalf of 66 delegations of the first UN General Assembly 
Resolution regarding R2P – A/res/63/308 as adopted in 14 September 2009, A/63/PV.105.
38 Rwanda has co-chaired the R2P Group of Friends. See ‘Statement on Behalf of the Group 
of Friends of R2P at 36th Session of the Human Rights Council’, 12 September 2017, https://
www.globalr2p.org/resources/statement-on-behalf-of-the-group-of-friends-of-r2p-at 
-36th-session-of-the-human-rights-council/ accessed 10 June 2020.
39 We are grateful here to the comments on an anonymous reviewer who specified in detail 
the work of the ‘Global Network of R2P Focal Points’ whose eighth annual meeting was 
co-hosted by Finland and Mexico, ‘Summary of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Global 
Network of R2P Focal Points Helsinki, Finland, 2018’, 28 September 2018, https://www 
.globalr2p.org/publications/summary-of-the-eighth-annual-meeting-of-the-global-net 
work-of-r2p-focal-points-helsinki-finland-june-2018/, accessed 20 September 2019; and 
‘Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes’ (gaamac) whose March 2013 founding 
state partners included: Argentina, Switzerland, Tanzania, Australia, Costa Rica, and Den-
mark, gaamac, ‘History’, https://www.gaamac.org/information-platform-www/web-pag 
es/view/1, accessed 20 September 2019.
40 Kenkel and De Rosa, ‘Localization and Subsidiarity in Brazil’s Engagement with the Re-
sponsibility to Protect’, p. 333.
41 Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz and Julian Junk, ‘Emerging Norm and Rhetorical Tool: Eu-
rope and a Responsibility to Protect’, Conflict, Security & Development, 14/4: 429–460 
(2014); Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Australian Foreign Policy’, 
 Australian Journal of International Affairs, 64/4: 432–448 (2010); Chiara De Franco, Chris-
toph Meyer and Karen E. Smith, ‘Europe and the European Union’ in Alex J. Bellamy and 
Tim Dunne’ (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016); Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘The Obama Administration and R2P: Progress, 
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body of work focuses on various Western states’ attempts to implement or in-
ternalise the norm and does not frame that process in terms of localisation 
studies. In sum there is a gap in the R2P localisation literature when it comes 
to Western cases of localisation, with potentially troubling implications, which 
we look to address by complementing existing non-Western studies with one 
from the US.
The exception to this trend which we build on is Vaughan and Dunne’s ex-
amination of the US localisation and implementation of R2P in the case of the 
2011 Libyan intervention. They argue that the Obama administration’s Geno-
cide and Mass Atrocity Prevention/Protection (gmapp) policy was the US’s 
localisation of the global R2P norm, which informed and facilitated their lead-
ership role in the intervention. As the authors rightly indicate, the way that 
norms matter can differ across distinct cases, and ‘even liberal states – whose 
self-identities include the promotion of values such as human rights, political 
freedoms and freedom from persecution – vary considerably with each other 
in how they align their responsibility to protect with domestic thresholds and 
identity’.42 Their analysis is thus important because it demonstrates the adap-
tations that are made by a Western state. It confirms our assessment of the 
existing literature, noting as they do, that ‘these differences and convergences 
between R2P and gmapp conform to the expectations set out in the literature 
on norm localisation. In this instance, however, it is not middle and small powers 
outside the liberal order that are experiencing localisation. It happens to world 
powers too’ [emphasis added].43
Vaughan and Dunne demonstrate how the United States localised R2P as 
gmapp, as well as how gmapp applied in the case of Libya. Ultimately their fo-
cus is on accounting for the US leadership role in the 2011 Libyan intervention. 
As a consequence, some questions remain unanswered. In particular, and cru-
cially for the understanding of when the US might intervene, the gmapp does 
not ‘clarify the conditions under which coercive instruments would be used 
to respond to mass atrocities’ and it does not ‘answer divisive questions about 
Problems and Prospects’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 4/4: 399–423 (2012); Bruce W. 
Jentleson, ‘United States’ in Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Julian Junk, ‘The Two-
Level Politics of Support – US Foreign Policy and the Responsibility to Protect’, Conflict, 
Security & Development, 14/4: 535–564 (2014); Edward Newman and Cristina Stefan, ‘Nor-
mative Power Europe? The EU’s Embrace of the “Responsibility to Protect” in a Transi-
tional International Order’, Journal of Common Market Studies, online, 25 July 2019; Jason 
Ralph, Mainstreaming the Respossibility to Protect in UK Strategy, una-UK Briefing Report 
No. 2 (United Nations Association-UK, 2014).
42 Vaughan and Dunne, ‘Leading from the Front’, pp. 43, 31.
43 ibid., pp. 30–36, 44.
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who should intervene (unilateral or multilateral), when (threshold, condi-
tions), where (selectivity) or how (strategy, doctrine, command and control)’.44 
The local US variant of R2P thus seems to remain purposefully open about 
the key questions raised by R2P’s Pillar 3.45 As the authors note, ‘the precise 
conditions under which the [US Government] would be prepared to respond 
militarily to mass atrocities remains underdeveloped in terms of the policies 
and processes associated with gmapp’.46
Vaughan and Dunne also recognise that norm meanings can change for 
each case under study. It is to one of these cases that we now turn. In the fol-
lowing section, we demonstrate how official US discourse localised the mean-
ing of R2P in the initial phase of the Syria conflict. Rather than looking at how 
R2P was localised by America’s own atrocity prevention norm at an institu-
tional level within a bureaucratic context, we explore how the meaning of R2P 
in discursive use was grafted on to the cultural tropes associated with Ameri-
can exceptionalism so as to build congruence between R2P and local  American 
beliefs, identities, traditions, and preferences.
2 Localising R2P: Regime Change and the Inevitability of Liberalism
American policy discourse on Syria responded to several considerations, some 
normative and some strategic or prudential, yet it also included explicit refer-
ences to R2P and the responsibility of states to protect vulnerable populations. 
The discourse was also imbued with references to local American values and 
traditions that enabled US policymakers to graft R2P onto their pre-existing 
local culture. In particular, and as we demonstrate in this section, R2P became 
discursively tied to the idea of ‘regime change’, which was prevalent in the 
American interpretation of the Arab Spring. From the beginning of the Syrian 
crisis in 2011, American policymakers made repeated references to R2P. The 
draft UN Security Council resolution of 4 October 2011 supported by the nine 
Council members including the US (but vetoed by Russia and China, with four 
abstentions) cited R2P when insisting on ‘the Syrian Government’s primary re-
sponsibility to protect its population’.47 President Obama echoed this several 
44 ibid., p. 34.
45 Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, pp. 2, 
22–27.
46 ibid., p. 44.
47 United Nations Security Council, ‘France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution’, S/2011/612, 4 October 2011, http://
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/612, accessed 19 March 2019.
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months later, stating that ‘every government has the responsibility to protect 
its citizens, and any government that brutalizes and massacres its people does 
not deserve to govern’.48 This was repeated across the administration. Secre-
tary of State Clinton, for instance, explained that ‘it is against every norm of 
international law and human decency for a government to be murdering its 
own people’.49 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman 
identified ‘the duty of every responsible nation shares to protect civilians un-
der attack’.50 R2P also informed Congressional discourse: an April 2012 Senate 
resolution stated that ‘since the uprisings in Syria began in January 2011, the 
Government of Syria has manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect its 
people’.51 At the end of 2013, the R2P discourse appeared well-established: in 
the words of the White House Press Secretary ‘The Syrian government must 
respect its obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the ci-
vilian population’.52
Yet in the American discourse on Syria and R2P there were also repeated 
calls for regime change, and these calls were influenced by a specific locali-
sation of R2P in US values and identities. From this perspective, as in the 
Obama reference cited above, the regime that was unwilling to protect its citi-
zens, and indeed targeted them, did not deserve to govern. Calling for regime 
change and democracy can indeed be consistent with the aim of protecting a 
 population from atrocity crimes but R2P is not intrinsically attached to regime 
48 Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on Syria’, 4 February 2012, https://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/04/statement-president-syria, accessed 25 February 
2019. A year later, Obama would also declare: ‘what the Syrian regime is doing is unaccept-
able. It is contrary to every international norm that we believe in’. Barack Obama, ‘Re-
marks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in a 
Joint Press Conference’, 14 March 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press 
-office/2012/03/14/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-king 
dom-joint-, accessed 19 March 2019.
49 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks at the Friends of the Syrian People Ministerial Meeting’, 6 July 
2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/194628.htm, ac-
cessed 25 February 2019.
50 Wendy R. Sherman, ‘Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
 Representatives – 14 October 2011’ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011).
51 United States Senate, ‘Senate Resolution 428 – Condemning the Government of Syria for 
Crimes against Humanity, and for Other Purposes’, 19 April 2012, https://www.congress 
.gov/congressional-record/2012/4/19/senate-section/article/s2551-2?q=%7B%22search% 
22%3A%5B%22syria%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=146, accessed 19 March 2019.
52 Jay Carney, ‘Statement by Press Secretary Jay Carney on the Ongoing Air Assaults by 
the Syrian Government’, 23 December 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the 
-press-office/2013/12/23/statement-press-secretary-jay-carney-ongoing-air-assaults-syri 
an-governm, accessed 19 March 2019.
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change or even democracy promotion.53 The then Special Advisor to the UN 
Secretary-General, Edward Luck argued:
I should say that it isn’t the goal of the responsibility to protect to change 
regimes. The goal is to protect populations. It may be in some cases that 
the only way to protect populations is to change the regime, but that cer-
tainly is not the goal of the R2P per se.54
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect argued during this period 
that ‘R2P should be the constructive context to frame [Kofi Annan’s] height-
ened diplomatic effort’,55 which in 2012 focused on establishing a peacekeep-
ing force with the consent of the parties and Security Council backing.56 But in 
the American ideational context, a change of regime in Syria was deemed nec-
essary and inevitable. Indeed, because Syrian President Assad’s removal from 
power was framed in the wider context of the Arab Spring, which had seen re-
gional dictators fall, it was considered part of the inexorable ‘movement of his-
tory’; and because Assad’s fall was inevitable it enabled the US to commit to 
regime change without thinking of the means or costs of realising that com-
mitment. This idealistic view about ‘being on the right side of history’,57 which 
is prevalent in discourses that construct an American sense of exceptionalism, 
influenced how US responsibilities to the Syrian population were understood. 
As such, calling for regime change became the way the US would discharge its 
responsibility in this particular situation.
After their first invocations of R2P, it was not long into the crisis that US 
policy shifted to ‘regime change’. Articulated rather hesitantly at first,58 this 
53 For further discussion see Staunton and Ralph, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Norm Cluster’.
54 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Interview: Will Syria Follow Libya? Interviewee: Edward C. 
Luck, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, 
 Visiting Fellow’, 1 September 2011, https://www.cfr.org/syria/syria-follow-libya/p25745, 
 accessed 7 February 2020. See also Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the 
Problem of Regime Change’, 27 September 2011, https://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/the-re 
sponsibility-to-protect-and-the-problem-of-regime-change/, accessed 7 February 2020.
55 Simon Adams, ‘A Diplomatic Surge for Syria?’, Huffington Post, 2 October 2012.
56 What’s in Blue, ‘Syria Draft Presidential Statement’, 4 April 2012, https://www.whatsin 
blue.org/2012/04/syria-draft-presidential-statement.php#, accessed 7 February 2020.
57 Hillary Clinton, ‘Press Availability on the Meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People’, 24 
February 2012, http://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/184635 
.htm, accessed 19 March 2019; Jay Carney, ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney’, 
19 March 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/19/press 
-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-31912, accessed 25 February 2019.
58 See the reluctance of Ambassador Feltman to explicitly recognise change of regime as the 
position of the US in July 2011. Jeffrey Feltman, ‘Hearing before the Subcommittee on the 
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policy became the official one from August 2011 onwards. That month, Obama 
made a clear statement calling for Assad to leave:
The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President 
Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform 
have rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his 
own people. We have consistently said that President Assad must lead a 
democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of 
the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.59
This call was taken up by Clinton60 and repeated by various other administra-
tion officials as well as in Congress. The White House Press Secretary, for in-
stance, declared that ‘President Assad must step down now before taking his 
country further down this very dangerous path’.61 Vice-President Biden rein-
forced this position when he said that ‘President Obama and I and nearly all of 
our partners and allies are convinced that President Assad, a tyrant, hell-bent 
on clinging to power, is no longer fit to lead the Syrian people and he must 
go’.62 Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben 
Rhodes declared that ‘the United States believes that any transition in Syria has 
to involve Bashar al-Assad leaving power’ and insisted that it was not the state 
or the institutions that should be changed but Assad himself and ‘the top of his 
Middle East and South Asia – July 27, 2011’ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2011).
59 Barack Obama, ‘Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria’, 18 August 2011, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president 
-obama-situation-syria, accessed 25 February 2019.
60 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks with Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere after Their 
Meeting’, 12 August 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/ 
08/170501.htm, accessed 25 February 2019.
61 Jay Carney, ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on Violence in Syria’, 7 October 2011, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/07/statement-press-secretary 
-violence-syria, accessed 25 February 2019. Similar calls are made in Jay Carney, ‘Press 
Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney Aboard Air Force One’, 19 July 2013, https://obam 
awhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/19/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay 
-carney-aboard-air-force-one-7192012, accessed 19 March 2019; Jay Carney, ‘Press Brief-
ing by Press Secretary Jay Carney’, 18 July 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
the-press-office/2013/07/18/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-7182013, accessed 25 
February 2019.
62 Joe Biden, ‘Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to the Munich Security Conference. Hotel 
Bayerischer Hof Munich, Germany’, 2 February 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives 
.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/02/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-munich-security 
-conference-hotel-bayeri, accessed 25 February 2019.
Downloaded from Brill.com06/25/2021 12:14:02PM
via free access
Docherty, Mathieu and Ralph260
global responsibility to protect 12 (2020) 246-270
regime’.63 The US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford also expressed this opinion 
in a direct way in front of the Senate: ‘Assad has lost all legitimacy and must 
go’.64 Obama reiterated this exact same call numerous times: ‘Assad needs to 
go. He needs to transfer power to a transitional body. That is the only way that 
we’re going to resolve this crisis’.65
It was of course appropriate in the normative context created by R2P to ar-
gue that Syrian officials should indeed be ‘held accountable’;66 and the idea 
that ‘Bashar al-Assad [should] be tried before the International Criminal Court 
for committing crimes against humanity’67 was prominent in US discourse 
(despite the United States’ ambiguous policy towards that institution). The 
Assad regime was seen as illegitimate and as forfeiting its sovereignty, and it 
followed from this that its leader should face political and criminal account-
ability. As Obama explained in June 2013: ‘my objective, understand, is Assad 
leaving because he delegitimized himself by what he did to his people’.68 
63 Ben Rhodes, ‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Deputy National Security 
Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes’, 17 June 2013, https://obamawhite 
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-car 
ney-and-deputy-national-security-a, accessed 25 February 2019.
64 Robert Ford, ‘Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations – 31 October 2013’ 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
65 Barack Obama, ‘Joint Press Conference by President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan of 
Turkey’, 16 May 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/16/
joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-erdogan-turkey, accessed 
19 March 2019. Obama also declared: ‘I think Assad must go’. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks 
by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint Press Conference’, 
20 March 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/20/re 
marks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-joint-press-, accessed 19 
March 2019.
66 United States House of Representatives, ‘Resolution Expressing Support for Peaceful 
Demonstrations and Universal Freedoms in Syria and Condemning the Human Rights 
Violations by the Assad Regime’, 3 June 2011, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-con 
gress/house-resolution/296/text, accessed 19 March 2019.
67 United States House of Representatives, ‘Resolution Calling for Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad to be Tried before the International Criminal Court for Committing Crimes 
against Humanity’, 15 June 2012, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-res 
olution/687/text, accessed 19 March 2019. See also United States Senate, ‘Hearing before 
the Committee on Foreign Relations – 11 April 2013’ (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 2013).
68 Matt Compton, ‘President Obama Discusses the National Security Agency on Charlie 
Rose’, 18 June 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/06/18/president 
-obama-discusses-national-security-agency-charlie-rose, accessed 19 March 2019. Kerry 
adopts a similar position: ‘he has shelled universities and killed innocent students sitting 
at their desks. He shelled schools with napalm and burned innocent children who were 
there trying to learn. He has bombed and gassed people in his country so that more than 
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Obama also declared that ‘in Syria, the future must not belong to a dictator 
who massacres his people’.69 Likewise, Secretary Clinton insisted the US had 
‘nothing invested in the continuation of a regime that must kill, imprison and 
torture its own citizens to maintain power’.70
Underpinning this linking of R2P to regime change was a local American 
predisposition to interpret the crisis in Syria through the lens of the Arab 
Spring, which itself was interpreted as part of the inexorable movement of his-
tory away from authoritarian regimes like Assad’s and towards liberalism and 
democracy. The construction of the situation in Syria as part of a historic force 
sweeping the Middle East resonated at that time with the Obama administra-
tion’s attempts to reset US foreign policy after the perceived failures of the 
Bush administration in that region. This construction also resonated with local 
values and convictions in a teleological vision of history, thus providing the 
‘logical’ link between R2P and regime change and a specific localisation of R2P.
The inevitability of change was expressed unanimously by the Obama ad-
ministration.71 As Obama declared, ‘ultimately, this dictator will fall, as dicta-
tors in the past have fallen’.72 The Assad regime is thus doomed to an ‘inevita-
ble collapse’.73 Likewise, Clinton insisted on ‘the inevitable fall of Assad’ in the 
same way as her successor Kerry did.74 As Clinton bluntly expressed in 2011: 
115,000 or so are dead. How can that man claim to rule under any legitimacy in the fu-
ture?’. John Kerry, ‘Remarks with Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid al-Atiyah before Their 
Meeting’, 21 October 2013, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/10/215713 
.htm, accessed 19 March 2019.
69 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President to the UN General Assembly’, 25 September 
2012, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-un 
-general-assembly, accessed 25 February 2019.
70 Hillary Clinton, ‘Meeting with Syrian Activists’, 2 August 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/08/169489.htm, accessed 19 March 2019.
71 This sense of inevitability is also criticised by some voices: in the Senate, for instance, 
Senator McCain criticised the dominant view (‘Nothing in this world is predetermined, 
and claims about the inevitability of events can often be a convenient way to abdicate 
responsibility’ in United States Senate, ‘Syria’, 5 March 2012, https://www.congress.gov/
congressional-record/2012/3/5/senate-section/article/s1377-2?q=%7B%22search%22% 
3A%5B%22syria%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=123, accessed 19 March 2019).
72 Barack Obama, ‘Press Conference by the President’, 6 March 2012, https://obamawhite-
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/06/press-conference-president, accessed 19 
March 2019.
73 Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on Syria’, 4 February 2012, https://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/04/statement-president-syria, accessed 25 February 
2019.
74 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks with Foreign Minister Davutoglu after Their Meeting’, 11 August 
2012, http://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/196358.htm, 
 accessed 19 March 2019. See also Hillary Clinton, ‘“Coffee Break with Hillary Clinton” 
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‘Look, Assad’s going to be gone; it’s just a question of time’.75 Some even went 
as far as comparing the Assad regime to a ‘dead man walking’, insisting that the 
‘real question’ was not whether the regime could survive but rather how many 
steps it could still take.76 For Obama, Assad was using ‘the repressive tactics of 
the past’77 and ‘he and his regime will be left in the past [while] the courageous 
Syrian people who have demonstrated in the streets will determine its future’.78 
As the following section demonstrates, this interpretation of the Syria situa-
tion as a democratic revolution that was on the right side of history, and there-
fore destined to succeed, resonated especially well with a sub-discourse of 
American exceptionalism referred to as ‘exemplarism’. In the discursive con-
text it created, the US should not corrupt a ‘homegrown revolution’ by inter-
vening on its behalf. Rather, it should support that revolution politically and 
rhetorically by insisting on the overthrow of the regime, which it assumed was 
inevitable.
3 R2P and American ‘Exemplarism’
The Arab Spring narrative and the ‘inevitability’ of the triumph of democratic 
revolutions thus enabled US officials to call for regime change without answer-
ing the second order questions of how to bring that about; and, because that 
 Hosted by cnn-Turk and Moderated by Sirin Payzin’, 16 July 2011, https://2009-2017.state 
.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168667.htm, accessed 25 February 2019; and 
 Hillary Clinton, ‘Press Availability in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates’, 9 June 2011, 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/06/165351.htm, accessed 
25 February 2019; John Kerry, ‘Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh after 
Their Meeting’, 17 July 2013, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/212075 
.htm, accessed 19 March 2019.
75 Hillary Clinton, ‘Interview with Norah O’Donnell of cbs News’, 18 November 2011, 
http://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/177370.htm, accessed 19 
March 2019.
76 Special Coordinator for Regional Affairs Hof in United States House of Representatives, 
‘Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia – 14 December 2011’ 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011).
77 Barack Obama, ‘Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria’, 18 August 2011, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president 
-obama-situation-syria, accessed 25 February 2019.
78 Barack Obama, ‘Statement by the President on the Violence in Syria’, 31 July 2011, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/31/statement-president-vio 
lence-syria, accessed 25 February 2019. Obama also declared: ‘in Syria, I have no doubt 
that the Assad regime will soon discover that the forces of change cannot be reversed, and 
that human dignity cannot be denied’ (Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in State 
of the Union Address’, 24 January 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press 
-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address, accessed 25 February 2019).
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narrative filtered the way US officials perceived America’s responsibility to pro-
tect, it enabled them to claim this was properly discharged by calling for politi-
cal and criminal accountability. Underpinning this approach of course was a 
reluctance to commit US forces to the conflict, but that ‘realist’ impulse could 
only be reconciled with R2P once the norm had been ‘localised’ by an excep-
tionalist discourse. This is because the ‘exemplarist’ sub-discourse of Ameri-
can exceptionalism insists that it was appropriate for the United States to re-
main on the sidelines of what essentially was an uprising of the Syrian people 
against the Assad regime. Indeed, because of the dominance of the Arab Spring 
framing, the vulnerability of the Syrian population to atrocity crimes became 
fused with this exceptionalist narrative which focused on the ideal of a home-
grown and indigenous ‘revolution’ for liberty that was reminiscent of the his-
tory of the US itself.
H. W. Brands captures the ‘exemplarist’ strand of the American exceptional-
ist tradition in his book What America Owes the World.79 This accepts the US 
role as a vanguard in the march of world history toward democracy, but it 
claims to fulfil that role by perfecting American institutions at home. Meddling 
in the affairs of other nations jeopardises the legitimacy of foreign revolution, 
threatens the institutions that protect US liberty (especially the checks and 
balances against presidential power), and undermines the example the US 
constitutional democracy sets other nations. John Quincy Adams – President 
Monroe’s Secretary of State – in his 1823 remarks on the occasion of the revolu-
tions in Latin America, typifies exemplarism, and clearly it resonates with the 
Obama administration’s predisposition on the Syria situation:
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall 
be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. 
But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-
wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and 
vindicator only of her own … She well knows that by once enlisting under 
other banners than her own, were they even banners of foreign indepen-
dence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all 
wars of interest and intrigue … She might become the dictatress of the 
world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.80
79 Brands, What America Owes the World, p. viii. Walter Russell Mead equates this with the 
‘Jeffersonian’ tradition in Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed 
the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001); see also Walter McDougall, Promised Land, 
Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (Boston: Mariner Books, 
1998).
80 Quoted in Brands, What America Owes the World, pp. 8–9.
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This exemplarist approach – the US would support democratic values ‘by 
living them’ – was evident in Obama’s foreign policy in the years preceding the 
Syrian crisis. The US would ‘not seek to impose these values through force’.81 
Democracy and individual empowerment, Obama’s first National Security 
Strategy insisted, ‘need not come at the expense of cherished identities’;82 and, 
as the President told his audience at Cairo University, ‘no system of govern-
ment can or should be imposed upon one nation by any other’. Each nation, 
he added, ‘gives life to this principle in its own way, grounded in the tradi-
tions of its own people’. But this pluralist sensitivity did not lessen the commit-
ment ‘to governments that reflect the will of the people’ or ‘an unyielding be-
lief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and 
have a say in how you are governed’. These the President insisted ‘are not just 
American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them 
everywhere’.83
This particularly American (local) exemplarist tradition became very im-
portant in the Syrian case as R2P was interpreted through it. In this localisation 
of R2P, a key element was the fact that the ultimate responsibility lay with the 
Syrian ‘people’ (and not with outside actors), which is in contrast to R2P lan-
guage that talks about protecting ‘populations’, presumably because ‘popula-
tion’ is apolitical (and thus legitimately humanitarian and universal), in a way 
that ‘the people’ is not, especially in its associations to American values (for 
example, ‘we the people’ and ‘a government of, for and by the people’). It was 
only through their own efforts to liberate themselves that the Syrian ‘people’ 
could genuinely protect itself from the Syrian regime. As bluntly put by Ford: 
‘Ultimately this is a Syrian conflict. It is not an American conflict’.84 Obama 
also confirmed this view when arguing that ‘we’re not putting our troops in the 
middle of somebody else’s war’85 and that ‘we cannot resolve someone else’s 
civil war through force’.86 He explained that:
81 United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: 
President of the United States, 2010), p. 5.
82 ibid., p. 35.
83 Barack Obama, ‘Speech in Cairo’, 4 June 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/
politics/04obama.text.html, accessed 10 April 2019.
84 Ford, ‘Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations – 31 October 2013’.
85 Susan Rice, ‘Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security Advisor’, 9 September 
2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/09/remarks-pre 
pared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice, accessed 25 February 2019.
86 United States House of Representatives, ‘Mo Brooks of Alabama Voting “No” on Attack-
ing Syria’, 11 September 2013, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2013/9/11/ 
house-section/article/h5480-1?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22syria%22%5D%7D& 
resultIndex=305, accessed 26 February 2019.
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It is up to the Syrian people to choose their own leaders, and we have 
heard their strong desire that there not be foreign intervention in their 
movement … It is time for the Syrian people to determine their own des-
tiny, and we will continue to stand firmly on their side.87
The emphasis was thus clearly on the responsibility of the Syrian people them-
selves: ‘the ultimate destiny of the Syrian regime and the Syrian people lies 
with the people themselves’.88 As early as November 2011, Secretary Clinton 
was also distancing the US from the Arab Spring movements: ‘These revolu-
tions are not ours. They are not by us, for us, or against us’.89 As a result, Syrians 
‘are going to have to resolve that issue’.90 In fact, as Clinton added, ‘many of the 
choices ahead are, honestly, not ours to make’.91 In essence, then, the Syrian 
crisis became ‘their’ – that is, the Syrians’ – ‘revolution’ and responsibility, 
while an R2P framing would have made Syrian ‘vulnerability’ a US responsibili-
ty.92 The exemplarist framing in fact made the Syrian revolution an opportu-
nity and reduced US responsibilities in ways that could be discharged through 
a rhetorical rather than material commitment.
87 Barack Obama, ‘Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria’, 18 August 2011, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president-
obama-situation-syria, accessed 25 February 2019.
88 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks on Libya and Syria’, 15 July 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168656.htm, accessed 25 February 2019. See similar 
expressions in Hillary Clinton, ‘Press Availability in Istanbul’, 15 July 2011, http://2009-2017 
.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168625.htm, accessed 19 March 2019; 
and Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks on the Situation in Syria’, 18 August 2011, http://2009-2017 
.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/08/170673.htm, accessed 19 March 2019.
89 Hillary Clinton, ‘Keynote Address at the National Democratic Institute’s 2011 Democracy 
Awards Dinner’, 7 November 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2011/11/176750.htm, accessed 25 February 2019. In the same speech Clinton neverthe-
less adds that ‘we do have a role. We have the resources, capabilities, and expertise to 
support those who seek peaceful, meaningful, democratic reform. And with so much that 
can go wrong, and so much that can go right, support for emerging Arab democracies is 
an investment we cannot afford not to make’.
90 United States Senate, ‘Authorizing the Limited and Specified Use of the United States 
Armed Forces Against Syria – Motion to Proceed’, 10 September 2013, https://www.con 
gress.gov/congressional-record/2013/9/10/senate-section/article/s6312-2?q=%7B%22sear 
ch%22%3A%5B%22syria%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=349, accessed 26 February 2019.
91 Clinton, ‘Keynote Address at the National Democratic Institute’s 2011 Democracy Awards 
Dinner’.
92 For more on the potential for democracy promotion and atrocity prevention to clash in 
practice when they are clearly aligned in theory see Staunton and Ralph, ‘The Responsi-
bility to Protect Norm Cluster’.
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It might be argued that the exemplarist tradition was present in the Obama 
administration’s thinking prior to the Syrian crisis, which of course saw the 
United States militarily intervene to protect the Libyan population by over-
throwing the Ghaddafi regime. This begs the question of why this localised 
version of R2P, which we argue was behind non-intervention in Syria, led to a 
very different policy in Libya. Two points can be made in response. First, there 
was an understanding, often expressed in official discourse, that the Syria situ-
ation was different to the Libyan one;93 and second, even in the Libyan situa-
tion, US policy drew on the exemplarist position to justify the decision not to 
put ‘boots on the ground’. This failure to intervene, especially with respect to 
Syria, raised a different realist concern, one that lamented the mismatch in 
policy ends and means. But again, by viewing the situation through the prism 
of the Arab Spring and the progress of history, and by framing US responsibility 
in terms of the exemplarist tradition, US policymakers were able to claim they 
were acting appropriately, despite the ends/means mismatch and despite the 
manifest failure to protect.
Of course, the discursive trope that ‘Syria is not Libya’ implied that ‘Syria’ 
was potentially another ‘Iraq’ for the US; the ghost of which is evident in the 
following exchange between Congressman Collins and Secretary of State Kerry 
on the Syria situation:
Mr. COLLINS. … it goes back to the saying of a former Secretary, that if we 
break it, we own it. …
Secretary KERRY. We didn’t break it.
Mr. COLLINS. I understand.
Secretary KERRY. It is broken.94
This invoked the famous ‘pottery barn’ rule – you break it you fix it – which 
President George W. Bush’s Secretary of State Colin Powell cited before the 
2003 US invasion of Iraq. Powell’s point was that responsibility to protect (or 
in  that instance protect and rebuild) can flow from culpability as well as 
 capability.95 As the Syrian situation was, as far as the US political elite was 
93 Ralph, Holland and Zhekova, ‘Before the Vote’.
94 United States House of Representatives, ‘Hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs – 4 September 2013’ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013).
95 Jason Ralph and Jason Souter, ‘A Special Responsibility to Protect: The UK, Australia and 
the Rise of Islamic State’, International Affairs, 91/4: 709–723 (2015).
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 concerned, a homegrown revolution that the US was not implicated in, it was 
right to remain on the sidelines. As argued in the Senate, for instance: ‘At the 
end of the day, it is up to the Syrians, through a political process, to determine 
their own government’.96
Our argument then is that the US official discourse constructed its responsi-
bility to protect the Syrian population in a way that grafted it on to the tradi-
tional ways of thinking and speaking that are deeply embedded in American 
culture. That discourse then refracted the situation as a ‘democratic revolution’ 
that the US should support by calling for regime change while remaining on 
the sidelines of the conflict that ensued. Vulnerable populations would be pro-
tected once the Assad regime was replaced and held accountable for its crimes; 
and that would not take long, and the costs would be limited, because the lens 
also portrayed the Assad regime as doomed. This then is how a particular pre-
disposition, which we identify as American exemplarism, helped to localise 
R2P. But it was far from being the only option on the table, and R2P could have 
been localised differently.
Indeed, calls for intervention were regularly heard in the legislative branch 
and in the press.97 These calls for action were linked to the identity of the US 
itself as a vanguard state: as put by Congressman Fortenberry: ‘The United 
States is not going to stand by idly and watch this kind of brutality. It is not who 
we are’.98 Or as Congressman Ackerman expressed it: ‘We can’t just be sitting 
here while these people are being slaughtered and maimed … It is unfair. It is 
96 United States Senate, ‘Authorizing the Limited and Specified Use of the United States 
Armed Forces Against Syria – Motion to Proceed’, 10 September 2013. See similar expres-
sions in United States House of Representatives, ‘Hearing before the Sub-Committee 
on  the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
 Representatives – 27 July 2011’ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011); Jay 
Carney, ‘Statement by the Press Secretary on Syria’, 7 June 2012, https://obamawhitehouse 
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/07/statement-press-secretary-syria, accessed 
7 October 2019.
97 We exclude here the specific calls made for a military intervention as a response to the 
chemical weapons use of August 2013. The interested readers will find several of these 
calls in United States House of Representatives, ‘Hearing before the Committee on For-
eign Affairs – 4 September 2013’ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013); 
John Kerry, ‘Statement on Syria’, 30 August 2013, http://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/re 
marks/2013/08/213668.htm, accessed 19 March 2019; and Barack Obama, ‘Statement by 
the President on Syria’, 31 August 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press 
-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria, accessed 19 March 2019.
98 United States House of Representatives, ‘Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle 
East and South Asia – 25 April 2012’ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012).
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inhumane. It is unworthy of us as a society’.99 The Syrian situation became a 
‘moral imperative’: ‘we and all other responsible nations have a moral impera-
tive to ensure that Bashar al-Assad is removed from power as soon as possible’.100
Yet even here it is interesting to note that the moral imperative to protect 
the Syrian people from inhumane action also translated into the removal of 
the Assad regime and illustrates again the localisation of R2P so that it could 
be grafted on to an American predisposition to support democratic revolu-
tions. Arguably this ‘vindicationist’ approach,101 whereby America would 
match the ends of regime change with the material means of bringing it about 
through military intervention, was more responsible than the ‘exemplarist’ ap-
proach that encouraged the revolutionaries while doing nothing to protect the 
population. Yet that was not the position of the administration, at least in this 
early period of the conflict.
4 Conclusion
In this article we have examined the US response to the early Syria crisis, 
 examining how it was framed in official discourse. We found that the situation 
was interpreted as a humanitarian crisis that triggered international society’s 
responsibility to protect, but that this was not the only significant framing. 
‘Syria’ was also understood in the context of the Arab Spring, and a discourse 
that put democratic movements on ‘the right side of history’ forecast the inevi-
table downfall of regimes like Assad’s without US intervention. This enabled 
US officials to reconstruct a national identity that was committed to demo-
cratic change while being sensitive to the harm that US power could cause. 
The US approach to discharging its responsibility to protect, in other words, 
was localised in the sense that the humanitarian crisis was refracted through 
a  lens that resonated strongly with America’s own identity as a state that is 
exceptional because of its position in the history of democratic revolutions. 
This meant President Obama, despite his professed Realism, was disinclined or 
unable to do anything other than call on Assad to go, even when in 2012 the 
99 Michael H. Posner, ‘Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South 
Asia – 27 July 2011’ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011).
100 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks at the Ad Hoc Ministerial Meeting on Syria’, 19 April 2012, 
http://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188147.htm, accessed 
19 March 2019.
101 Brands, What America Owes the World.
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United Nations saw that as an obstacle to a kind of peace that would mitigate 
the vulnerability of Syria’s populations.102
There is a normative implication that flows from this. When confronted by 
a humanitarian crisis and thinking how best to discharge their responsibility to 
protect, officials need to keep in focus that the R2P norm demands first and 
foremost the protection of vulnerable populations, and they should examine 
how their own national or ‘local’ beliefs, identities, traditions, practices, cogni-
tive priors or normative context may cloud the processes of practical reason-
ing that are necessary to do that effectively. In this instance, we conclude, the 
American exceptionalist – especially exemplarist – faith in the movement of 
history left vulnerable populations unprotected, and while the call that Assad’s 
regime should be held politically and criminally responsible for atrocities was 
appropriate in the broad normative context created by R2P, that was of no 
practical help to those vulnerable populations on the ground.
The point here is not that US officials were reinterpreting R2P. What R2P 
means in and for practice is indeterminate. That is defined on a case- by-
case basis and there was no prior prescription as to how to respond that the 
United States could reinterpret. Neither is the point that this form of locali-
sation is part of a ‘feedback loop’,103 which seeks to contest and reconstruct 
a ‘global’ norm. This was a response to a specific case and not part of a tar-
geted campaign to reinterpret R2P. The point instead is that US officials were 
predisposed to a definition of R2P that insisted on political and criminal ac-
countability (in effect regime change) as that was easier to ‘graft’ on to ‘local’ 
discourses or beliefs, identities, traditions, practices of American exceptional-
ism, especially the exemplarist perception of the US role in promoting global 
democracy.
There is nothing wrong with that interpretation of R2P, until one places it in 
the political context of the moment, which meant the Assad regime was not 
going to fall without external assistance and US exemplarism ruled that out. 
The alternative approach to protecting Syrian populations in this context was 
a UN-sponsored peace but that was only possible if Western governments 
stopped prejudging the outcome of political transition in their calls for regime 
change and US exemplarism ruled that out too. To the extent therefore that the 
US localised definition of R2P required regime change, to the extent that defi-
nition denied the means of delivering that, and to the extent that definition 
102 Jason Ralph, ‘What Should Be Done? Pragmatic Constructivist Ethics and the Responsi-
bility to Protect’, International Organization, 72/1: 191–196 (2018).
103 Prantl and Nakano, ‘Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia’.
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was an obstacle to alternative processes of protection, localisation theory can 
help explain R2P’s failure in Syria.
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